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The present study addresses effects of human redundancy on automation monitoring performance. Fourty-six 
participants performed a multi-task, consisting of three sub-tasks which simulate basic demands of operators in 
a chemical plant. One of the tasks involved the monitoring of an automated process. Participants were 
randomly assigned to three groups: (1) “Non-Redundant”: participants worked on all tasks alone. (2) 
“Redundant”: participants were informed that a second crewmate would work in parallel on the monitoring 
task. (3) “Redundant-Feedback”: like the “redundant” condition with the additional information that 
crewmembers’ individual monitoring performance would be tracked and fed back. Results provide evidence of 
social loafing effects in monitoring performance. Participants in the “redundant” condition cross-checked the 
automation significantly less than participants in the other groups. Moreover they were more prone to miss 
automation failures which occurred surprisingly. The anticipation that individual performance will be tracked 
and fed back after the task in the “redundant-feedback” group reduced this effect. The results suggest that 
human redundancy does not necessarily constitute an effective measure for enhancing reliability of automation 
monitoring and that expected positive effects can at least partially be off-set by a sort of social-loafing effect. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The use of redundancy is a common strategy to 
improve the fault-tolerance of technological systems. Its 
main purpose is to optimize systems’ overall reliability 
and safety through, e.g., having different components 
working in parallel or implementing multiple 
independent component backups in order to substitute 
safety critical system functions in case of failures (e.g. 
provision of emergency generators in nuclear power 
plants, Felsenthal & Fuchs, 1976).  
It has been suggested that the same basic principles 
may also be applied to enhance reliability of human 
performance in safety-critical or other risky tasks (e.g. 
Landau, 1969). More specifically, human redundancy for 
performing critical tasks has specifically been assumed 
to be one of the key elements of success of high-
reliability organizations such as nuclear power plants, air 
traffic control networks, commercial aviation systems or 
chemical plants (Hofmann, Jacobs, & Landy, 1995; La 
Porte & Consolini, 1991; Roberts, 1990). With respect to 
such organizations, human redundancy particularly is 
conceived as a recovery factor to control human error 
(Swain & Guttmann, 1983). For example, doubling the 
number of people involved in monitoring safety critical 
systems is expected to enhance the probability that at 
least one of them will detect an error.   
However, transferring the idea of technological 
redundancy to human work is not as straightforward as it 
seems (Conte & Jacobs, 1997; Felsenthal & Fuchs, 
1976). In order to reduce the risk of system failures, 
redundant units need to work parallel to and completely 
independent of each other. Yet, individuals in redundant 
work systems are normally aware of each other and, as a 
consequence, independence is not given (Sagan, 2004). 
One can assume that the knowledge that someone else is 
carrying out the same task can affect individual 
performance in ways that might counteract the benefits 
expected from human redundancy. This is suggested by 
the observation that individuals often tend to exert less 
effort if they work on tasks in group settings as 
compared to working alone. Such an effect has been well 
documented and is referred to as social loafing (Latané, 
Williams & Harkins, 1979; Karau & Williams, 1993). 
Accordingly, Sagan (2004) suggests that introducing 
human redundancy in complex technological facilities 
like nuclear power plants might even increase than lower 
safety issues.  
These considerations are of particular significance 
for domains where human redundancy usually represents 
the safety measure of choice, e.g. supervisory control of 
automated systems. First evidence that human 
redundancy might not enhance or even impair reliability 
in automation monitoring has been provided by Mosier 
and colleagues (Mosier, Skitka, Dunbar & McDonnell, 
2001; Skitka, Mosier & Rosenblatt , 2000) and 
Domeinski, Wagner,  Schoebel & Manzey (2008). 
Mosier et al. (2001) investigated whether human 
redundancy in monitoring cockpit automation would 
lead to performance improvements in terms of less 
automation bias. Comparing two-pilot crews versus 
single pilot crews they did not find any difference in the 
number of omission and commission errors committed 
by the crews. Yet, it is not clear from their data whether 
this finding was related to effects of social loafing in the 
two-pilot crews or just the fact that both crew members 
were affected individually by the same automation 
induced bias in decision-making. More direct evidence 
for social loafing effects was provided by a study of 
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Domeinski et al. (2007). In this study participants were 
required to perform an automation monitoring task 
which was one of three tasks that had to be performed 
concurrently simulating basic demands of operators of a 
chemical plant. Their data showed that participants who 
worked redundantly reduced their individual monitoring 
effort significantly compared to conditions where single 
operators were alone responsible for the task or where 
operators worked redundantly but got the information 
that their crew mate would be a low-performer. 
However, the participants of this study had only less task 
practice and worked for only 12 minutes on the task 
which might have impacted the results. Furthermore, the 
data did not reveal whether the social loafing effects 
observed in the redundant work setting would have 
increased the risk to miss any automation failures. 
The present experiment capitalizes on this earlier 
research. Using the same experimental paradigm as 
Domeinski et al. (2007) it was investigated (1) whether 
effects of social loafing could be replicated with 
participants who are better trained and work over a 
longer period on the task, (2) whether these effects are 
sufficiently strong to eventually raise safety risks by 
impairing the detection of single automation failures, 
and (3) whether implementing some sort of tracking of 
individual performance also in the redundant work 
setting would represent a countermeasure for negative 
consequences of human redundancy.  
  
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 
A sample of 46 students (29 male, 17 female, age: 
21-45 years) participated in the experiment. None of 
them had prior experiences with the task. Participation 
was compensated with Euro 10,-  plus an option to win 
one of four additional prizes of Euro 50,-  each, which 
were drawn among all participants. 
 
Apparatus and Tasks 
 
A PC-based laboratory multi-task environment was 
used for the experiment (Multi-Task Operator 
Performance Simulation, M-TOPS). It consists of three 
different tasks which were developed to simulate basic 
work demands of control room operators in a chemical 
plant. The user-interface is shown in figure 1. 
Resource Ordering Task (ROT). This task is shown 
in the upper left quadrant of the interface. Basically it 
represents a mental arithmetic task. Participants are 
instructed that they always have to assure the availability 
of required chemicals in order to keep the chemical 
process running. For this purpose the actual and the set 
value of an ascertained chemical is presented. 
Participants then have a maximal time-window of 15 
seconds to calculate the difference, to type the result in 
the designed ordering field, and to initiate the order by 
clicking on an order icon. After an order has been sent a 
new task is presented after a fixed interval of three 
seconds. However, participants can speed up the 
sequence by actively initiating a new trial via mouse-
click on the “arrow” icon (upper right). 
Figure 1. User interface of M-TOPS. 
 
 Coolant Exchange Task (CET). This task is 
displayed in the upper right quarter of the interface and 
involves an exchange of used coolant in two coolant 
tanks. For this purpose, different valves have to be 
opened and closed in a defined sequence. A complete 
exchange-cycle needs a minimum of 40s. After each 
completed exchange of coolant, indicated by a change of 
the color of the tank, participants have to re-activate the 
sub-system by a mouse-click on the “arrow” icon and a 
new set of tanks representing another sub-system is 
displayed.  
Monitoring Task (MOT). This task is displayed in 
the lower right quadrant of the interface. Participants 
have to supervise a system that autonomously analyses 
and controls the processes in different “reaction 
chambers”. Messages generated by the system always 
include an automatically derived description of the 
current state in a given compartment (e.g. “temperature 
high”; “process running”) and an information about the 
action that will be implemented by the automation (e.g. 
“reduction of temperature”; “no action needed”). The 
participants are instructed that the automation would 
work highly reliable but not perfect. They can verify the 
automation by double-checking different raw data of the 
simulated process (e.g. temperature, pressure) and 
inspecting a graph of “heat distribution” in a given 
chamber. Complete verification always includes 
Resource Ordering 
Coolant Exchange  
Monitoring Task 
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inspection of two different parameters which can be 
made visible by single mouse-clicks. Whenever an 
automation failure is identified, participants have to 
transfer the process control for the given chamber to 
manual control (mouse-click on “manual” icon). 
Participants have between 15-25 seconds to decide either 
to cross-check or to accept the automation. Varying 
time-windows are chosen in order to avoid highly 
routinized workflows. The specific importance of this 
task for overall safety of the production process is 
stressed in the instruction. 
 
Design 
 
The participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three experimental groups: (1) Non-redundant (Non-R): 
Participants of this group were told that they would work 
in a control room of a chemical plant and that they were 
the only responsible operator for all three tasks. All tasks 
were declared to represent tasks with specific safety 
relevance (2) Redundant (R): Participants of this group 
got the same basic instruction as the Non-R group but 
were additionally told that they would work as member 
of a two-person crew. The ROT and CET were declared 
as tasks they were alone responsible for. But they were 
informed that the MOT would be performed in parallel 
by their crew mate and that they both were responsible 
for this task. That is, whenever one of them would detect 
an automation error and indicate it, the corresponding 
reaction chamber would be transferred to an independent 
work-station which than would take over manual 
control. This would not be notified to the partner.  Every 
other detail but this part of the instruction corresponded 
directly to the non-redundant group. (3) Redundant-
Feedback (R-FB): In this condition participants were 
instructed like in the “R” condition with the 
complementary information that in addition to the team 
performance also the individual’s monitoring 
performance would be logged and fed back at the end of 
the experimental session.  
A second experimental factor was represented by a 
time-on-task factor (within-subjects), i.e. performance in 
all three tasks was assessed separately for twelve 
successive blocks lasting four minutes each. During the 
first nine blocks and blocks #11 and 12 all diagnoses and 
actions proposed by the automation were correct. Yet, in 
block #10 a total of four automation failures occurred 
which were reflected in wrong diagnoses of the 
automation. This variation was included in order to 
assess performance of the participants in detecting rare 
automation failures which occurred surprisingly after a 
prolonged period of reliable performance.  
 
 
 
 
Dependent variables 
 
Performance measures for all three tasks were 
derived from a log-file listing all actions done by the 
participant.  
Three measures were taken to assess monitoring 
performance in the MOT: (1) Monitoring Quality 
operationally defined as the number of reaction 
chambers for which the automation was  double-checked 
by accessing the two relevant system parameters needed 
to verify it, (2) Monitoring Quantity defined as number 
of reaction chambers for which participants initiated any 
action to double-check the automation independent on 
whether or not  this check was performed correctly, (3) 
Automation Failure Detection Performance defined by 
the percentage of participants in each group who 
correctly detected the different automation failures in 
block #10. 
Performance in the ROT was assessed by the 
number of correctly sent orders.  
Performance in the CET was operationally defined 
as the number of completed coolant exchange cycles per 
block. 
In addition to the performance measures also some 
subjective measures were collected which were used for 
purposes of manipulation check as well as for some 
insight in the impact of the different conditions on 
perceptions of task responsibility and effort. The 
participants had to indicate for each task on 7-point 
Likert scales (1) to what extent they were alone in charge 
of the task (1: “not at all”; 7: “fully”), (2) to what extent 
they felt responsible for task performance (1: “very 
little”; 7: “very much”), and (3) how much effort they 
had invested in conducting the task (1: “very little”; 7: 
“very much”).  
 
Procedure 
 
Two participants performed the experiment at the 
same time. They were sitting side to side at two 
workstations, separated by a movable wall. In the non-R 
condition the two participants were informed that they 
would work individually at two independent work 
stations. In the two redundancy conditions participants 
were formally assigned to a specific crew and informed 
that their work stations would be linked and that they 
would work together as a team.  
An introduction to M-TOPS and the specific 
working condition (non-R, R-FB, R) was provided by 
means of a written task description including an in-depth 
description of the automation verification procedure as 
part of the MOT and some practice trials for each 
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subtask separately. After this introduction the 
participants performed a six minute practice trial 
according to their working conditions, with all three 
tasks to be performed simultaneously. The practice trials 
were followed by the data collection trials lasting 48 
minutes (12 blocks á 4 minutes without any noticeable 
breaks in between). In the two redundancy conditions, 
the two participants were allowed to start the practice 
and data collection trials only when they had got a 
feedback on their screens that their partner had also 
logged into the system. This was done to support the 
illusion that both participants would really work on 
connected systems.  
At the end of the session all participants completed a 
short survey containing some questions on demographic 
background and the subjective ratings described above. 
The session concluded with a debriefing of participants. 
  
RESULTS 
 
Manipulation Check and Subjective Data 
 
As manipulation check, participants were asked to 
what extent they were alone in charge of the three sub-
tasks. No differences emerged in responses to this 
question with respect to the ROT and CET where 
participants of all groups provided mean scores > 5.88 
on the 7-point scale. However, this pattern was different 
for the MOT. As expected, participants of the Non-R 
group provided much higher ratings to this question 
(mean: 6.00) than the participants of the two redundant 
working groups (mean R-FB: 2.81; mean R: 2.75), 
F(2,43)=29.55, p<. 01.  
A similar effect emerged with respect to the 
subjectively perceived responsibility for the MOT. 
Compared to participants of the Non-R group who felt 
considerably responsible for this task (mean: 6.64), the 
participants of the R-FB group (mean: 5.88) and even 
more those of the R group (mean: 5.06) expressed lesser 
levels of felt responsibility for the MOT, F(2,43)=3,82, 
p<. 05.  
No differences between the experimental groups 
emerged in the subjective effort ratings for either task. 
 
Performance Measures  
 
Monitoring Task. Measures of monitoring quantity 
and quality were highly correlated, r(46)= 0.84, p < .001. 
Therefore statistical analyses were only performed for 
the measure of monitoring quality. Means of this 
measure for all groups across the twelve successive 
blocks are shown in figure 2. As becomes evident, 
participants in the Non-R control group performed 
considerably more double-checks of the automation than 
participants in the R-group whereas performance in the 
R-FB group differed only slightly from the Non-R 
condition. In addition, the experience of automation 
failures in block #10 only exerted a visible impact on the 
participants in the R-FB group. While these participants 
increased their monitoring performance considerably in 
the following two blocks, no effects on monitoring 
performance was observed in the two other groups. 
Whereas performance in the non-redundant working 
group remained on an anyway high level, performance 
of the participants of the R-group remained 
comparatively low even after exposure to automation 
failures. 
 Figure 2. Mean number and standard errors of complete cross-
checks in the Monitoring Task for the three groups across blocks. 
 
Data were analyzed by a 3 (Group) x 12 (Blocks) 
ANOVA. This analysis revealed two main effects for 
group, F(2,43) = 5.63, p < 0.01 and block, F (5.76, 
247.53) = 14.83; p < 0.01, as well as a significant group 
x block interaction, F(22,473 ) = 1.70, p<0.05.  
In addition, a separate 3(Group) x 4 (Blocks) 
ANOVA was conducted only including blocks #8, 9, 11 
and 12 (i.e. the blocks immediately before and after the 
block with automation failures). This analysis also 
revealed two significant main effects for group, 
F(2,43)=8.2, p<.01, and block, F(1.85, 79.39)=3.8, 
p<.05, as well as a significant group x block interaction, 
F(3.7, 79.39)= 4.2, p<.01.  
The percentages of participants in each group who 
correctly identified the automation failures in block #10 
are shown in table 1 for each of the four failures 
separately. In addition, also the percentages of 
participants are listed who identified ALL four failures 
in this block correctly.  
 
Table 1: Automation failure detection performance 
Group 
Automation Failures in Block #10 
1stv 2nd 3rd 4th ALL  
non-R 85.7 100 92.9 78.6 71.4 
R-FB 75.0 81.3 93.8 93.8 56.3 
R 50.0 56.3 68.8 87.5 31.3 
Monitoring Quality
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 As expected, clear performance differences 
emerged between the non-R and R group with respect to 
detection of the first two failures, as well as to the 
percentage of participants who detected ALL four 
failures correctly. Contrasts of the two groups by means 
of chi2-tests (Fisher-Yates) revealed all these differences 
significant (one-tailed testing):  χ2(1)= 4.29, p<.05 (1st),  
χ2(1)= 7.99, p<.01 (2nd). χ2(1)= 4.28, p<.05 (ALL). 
 
Resource Ordering Task. Participants in all 
experimental groups showed a comparable performance 
in this task. Only the main effect of blocks became 
significant, F(4.57, 196.62)= 16.46, p< .01. Performance 
improved successively across blocks in all groups. 
  
Coolant Exchange Task. Performance in the CET 
differed between groups, F(2,43) = 3.27, p<.05.. 
Participants of the non-R group on average completed 
slightly more exchange cycles (52.2; s=8.2) than 
participants in the R-FB (48.34; s=8.47) and R group 
(46.28, s=10.65). In addition also the block effect 
became significant, F(6.69, 287.85)=16.42, p<.01, 
indicating to a performance improvement across blocks 
in all groups. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The results of the present study confirm findings of 
earlier research and also provide new insights in the 
possible performance consequences of human 
redundancy in automation monitoring. The main 
findings can be summarized as follows: (1) Participants 
working in a redundant work setting were found to 
monitor the automation less carefully than participants 
who perceived themselves as the only responsible person 
for the task. This replicates results from the pilot study 
of Domeinski et a. (2007) who found similar effects, 
albeit for less trained subjects and significantly shorter 
work periods. (2) Going beyond these earlier findings, 
the present study also provides evidence that the 
reduction of individual monitoring performance in a 
redundant work setting can raise the risk of missing an 
automation failure that occurs surprisingly after a period 
of reliable functioning. (3) Most of the unwanted 
performance consequences of human redundancy could 
be reduced, albeit not fully avoided, by informing the 
redundantly working individuals that their individual 
performance would be logged and assessed. It can be 
assumed that this intervention has raised the perceived 
accountability for own performance even in a redundant 
work setting. Most interestingly it also led participants of 
this group to increase their monitoring effort 
considerably in response to the experience of automation 
failures. No such effect was observed in the R group.   
Overall this pattern of results fits nicely to the 
effects of social loafing known from group research in 
social psychology (Karau & Williams, 1993). They are 
further in line with the studies of team vs. individual 
effects on automation bias from Skitka et al. (2000) and 
Mosier et al. (2001). A possible theoretical explanation 
is provided by the so called Collective Effort Model 
(CEM, Karau & Williams, 1993) which suggests that 
individuals will be willing to exert effort on a collective 
task only to the degree that they expect their efforts to be 
instrumental in obtaining valued outcomes. The 
differences in the perceived responsibility for the MOT 
between the three groups further suggests that also a sort 
of social shirking of responsibility (Sagan, 2004) might 
have contributed to the observed loafing effects.  
In summary and with respect to application the 
findings of the present study suggest that human 
redundancy may not necessarily be an effective safety 
measure for performing supervisory control tasks 
because possible positive effects on reliability can be 
offset(at least partially) by a sort of social-loafing effect. 
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